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In integrated deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis (IDPSA), safe scenarios and prime implicants (PIs) are generated by
simulation. In this paper, we propose a novel postprocessingmethod, which resorts to a risk-based clusteringmethod for identifying
Near Misses among the safe scenarios. This is important because the possibility of recovering these combinations of failures within
a tolerable grace time allows avoiding deviations to accident and, thus, reducing the downtime (and the risk) of the system. The
postprocessing risk-significant features for the clustering are extracted from the following: (i) the probability of a scenario to develop
into an accidental scenario, (ii) the severity of the consequences that the developing scenario would cause to the system, and (iii)
the combination of (i) and (ii) into the overall risk of the developing scenario. The optimal selection of the extracted features is
done by a wrapper approach, whereby a modified binary differential evolution (MBDE) embeds a 𝐾-means clustering algorithm.
The characteristics of the Near Misses scenarios are identified solving a multiobjective optimization problem, using the Hamming
distance as a measure of similarity. The feasibility of the analysis is shown with respect to fault scenarios in a dynamic steam
generator (SG) of a nuclear power plant (NPP).
1. Introduction
Integrated deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis
(IDPSA) attempts to overcome some limitations of determin-
istic safety analysis (DSA) and probabilistic safety analysis
(PSA). The former is solidly founded on the multibarrier
and defense-in-depth concepts and aims at verifying the
capability of a nuclear power plant (NPP) to withstand a set
of postulated design basis accidents (DBA) [1, 2]. To account
for the uncertainties in themodel representation of the actual
plant behavior, conservatism is introduced in the calculations
by thermal-hydraulics (TH) codes underDBA conditions [3].
The latter aims at considering a wider set of possible acci-
dental scenarios and includes the quantification of accident
probabilities [4, 5].
Both DSA and PSA are scenario-based analyses, where
scenario selection and definition are done by expert judg-
ment. State of the art of DSA and PSA approaches can provide
relevant and important insights into what is already known
to be an “issue,” but they are not capable of revealing what,
and to what extent, is not known (i.e., scenarios which are
not expert-selected in the DSA and PSA inputs), with the
risk of neglecting or underestimating potentially dangerous
scenarios [6]. This is due to the difficulties of the static
structure of the classic DSA and PSA approaches in treating
dynamic variations that usually occur during the operational
time of a process [7] due to (i) stochastic disturbances (e.g.,
equipment failures), (ii) deterministic plant responses (i.e.,
transients), (iii) controls, and (iv) operator actions [6, 8, 9].
Indeed, the order and timing of the events occurring along a
scenario and the values of the process variables at the time of
event occurrence are critical in determining the evolution of
the scenario itself [10].
The development and application of IDPSA in prac-
tice must meet the challenge of computational complexity,
in both model construction and implementation and in
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postprocessing for the retrieval of the relevant information
from the scenario outcomes. The number of dynamic sce-
nario branches generated in IDPSA increases in power law
with the number of occurring events and, thus, ismuch larger
than in classical PSA based on event trees (ET) and fault
trees (FT). The a posteriori information retrieval (postpro-
cessing) then becomes quite burdensome and difficult [11, 12].
Continuous event trees (CETs) [13, 14] and dynamic event
trees (DETs) [15, 16] provide realistic frameworks for IDPSA.
However, their application is limited by their computationally
intensive nature, by the need of tailoring the algorithms to the
system under consideration and by the need of processing
a massive amount of data for any single initiating event
considered [17].
Postprocessing, in general, consists in classifying the gen-
erated dynamic scenarios into safe scenarios and prime impli-
cants (PIs), that is, sequences of events that representminimal
combinations of accident failures necessary for system failure
and cannot be covered by more general implicants [18].
Among the safe scenarios, Near Misses are important sce-
narios to be identified, because they are those sequences of
events that reach values of the safety parameters close to, but
not exceeding, the corresponding acceptable thresholds [19].
They can, thus, be relevant contributors to the “hidden” risk of
the system and should not be neglected, as a small deviation
may transform them into accidental scenarios.
In the literature, several authors introduce the concept of
NearMisses as accident precursors [20, 21]. We here consider
Near Misses as sequences of events that incidentally keep the
system in a safe state but endangered and insecure. For the
purpose of the analysis, they are here defined as sequences
of events similar to those leading the system into fault
conditions, except for one characteristic which is missing or
is slightly different (e.g., sequence time lag, different failure
magnitude, and different involved component in an event)
[22].
The postprocessing analysis entails a “Forward” classi-
fication of the dynamic scenarios into classes, that is, safe,
PIs, and Near Misses and a “Backward” identification of the
similarities of the features of the scenarios (i.e., stochastic
event occurrence and deterministic process variables values),
which characterize the groups of Near Misses among the
whole set of safe scenarios.
For the “Forward” classification of the Near Misses
sequences, we look at two factors of risk: the probability of
occurrence of an undesired event and the severity of the
consequence caused by the event [23]. Thus, we describe the
sequences of events by (i) the probability (𝑝) that the devel-
oping scenario is an accidental scenario, (ii) the consequence
(𝑐) that the developing scenario can cause to the system,
and (iii) the overall risk (𝑟) of the developing scenario that
we compute synthetically as 𝑟 = 𝑝×𝑐 (expected consequence).
The optimal features for discerning the Near Misses from
the safe scenarios are extracted from the profiles of 𝑝, 𝑐,
and 𝑟 of the accidental scenarios and selected by a wrapper
algorithm, which takes into account six statistical indicators
of 𝑝, 𝑐, and 𝑟, and, through a modified binary differential
evolution (MBDE) optimization algorithm, selects the best
features, which are fed to a 𝐾-means clustering algorithm,
which is a simple andwell-known clustering algorithm (other
classical clustering algorithms, such as mean-shift [24, 25] or
fuzzy 𝐶-means [19, 26]).
The outcomes of this “Forward” classification is, then,
interpreted by a “Backward” identification of the similarities
of the features of the Near Misses scenarios: the acquired
knowledge can be exploited in an online integrated riskmon-
itoring system that can rapidly detect the problem and set up a
repair strategy of the occurring failures before the system
reaches a fault state.
The proposed approach is illustrated with reference to
scenarios occurring in the steam generator (SG) of a NPP
[27]. We use multiple-valued logic (MVL) theory for mod-
eling the behavior of the system, where timing and sequences
of component failure events are determining the system
behavior [4]. By using MVL, we increase the limited descrip-
tion capability of binary variables in modeling the different
component operational states (e.g., a valve that can be closed,
partially closed, or fully open or can fail at different times)
and, therefore, perform an IDPSA postprocessing analysis on
the whole set of simulated accidental scenarios [17].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the SG
model used to generate the scenarios for the reliability anal-
ysis is presented [27], along with multistate representation
of the system dynamics. In Section 3, the PIs are identified
and the risk-based “Forward” and “Backward” Near Misses
identificationmethod is introducedwith reference to the case
study considered. In Section 4, conclusions and remarks are
drawn.
2. Case Study
2.1. The U-Tube Steam Generator (UTSG) Model. TheU-tube
steam generator (UTSG) under consideration is sketched in
Figure 1. The improper control of the water level, whose dif-
ficulties arise from nonminimum phase plant characteristics,
that is, plant strong inverse response behavior, particularly at
low operating power, due to the so-called “swell and shrink”
effects [28], is a major cause of NPP unavailability [28–30].
The reactor coolant enters the UTSG at the bottom and
moves upward and then downward in the inverted U-tubes,
transferring heat to the secondary fluid before exiting at
the bottom. The secondary fluid, the feedwater (𝑄
𝑒
), enters
the UTSG at the top of the downcomer, through the space
between the tube bundle wrapper and the SG shell. The value
of 𝑄
𝑒
is regulated by a system of valves: a low flow rate valve,
used when the operating power (𝑃
𝑜
) is smaller than 15% of
nominal power (𝑃
𝑛
), and a high flow rate valve when 𝑃
𝑜
>
0.15𝑃
𝑛
[27]. In the secondary side of the tube bundle, water
heats up, reaches saturation, starts boiling, and turns into a
two-phase mixture. The two-phase fluid moves up through
the separator/riser section, where steam is separated from
liquid water, and through the dryers, which ensure that the
exiting steam (𝑄V) is essentially dry. The separated water is
recirculated back to the downcomer.The balance between the
exiting 𝑄V and the incoming 𝑄𝑒 governs the change in the
water level in the SG. Because of the two-phase nature, two
types ofwater levelmeasurements are considered, as shown in
Figure 1, each reflecting a different level concept: the narrow
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Figure 1: Schematic of the UTSG [31].
range level (𝑁rl) is calculated by pressure difference between
two points close to the water level and indicates the mixture
level, whereas the wide range level (𝑊rl) is calculated by pres-
sure difference between the two extremities of the SG (steam
dome and bottom of the downcomer) and indicates the
collapsed liquid level that is related to the mass of water in
the SG.
“Swell and shrink” phenomena are alsomodeled to repro-
duce the dynamic behavior of the SG: when𝑄V increases, the
steam pressure in the steam dome decreases and the two-
phase fluid in the tube bundle expands causing𝑁rl to initially
swell (i.e., rise), instead of decreasing as would have been
expected by the mass balance; contrarily, if 𝑄V decreases or
𝑄
𝑒
increases, a shrink effect occurs. A similar model has been
presented in [27].
The𝑁rl is governed by 𝑄𝑒 and 𝑄V across the tube bundle
region of the SG as shown by the following transfer function:
𝑁rl (𝑠) =
1
𝑇
𝑛
𝑠
(𝑄
𝑒𝑓
(𝑠) − 𝑄
𝐺𝑉
(𝑠)) , (1)
where 𝑄
𝑒𝑓
is the flow rate of the incoming water in the tube
bundle, (2), 𝑄
𝐺𝑉
is the equivalent steam-water mixture flow
rate exiting the tube bundle region, (3), 𝑇
𝑛
is a time constant
that accounts for the𝑁rl dynamics.
The incoming water flow rate 𝑄
𝑒𝑓
is proportional to 𝑄
𝑒
:
𝑄
𝑒𝑓
(𝑠) =
1
(1 + 𝑇
ℎ
𝑠) (1 + 𝜏𝑠)
𝑄
𝑒
(𝑠) , (2)
where the lag 1/(1 + 𝜏𝑠) accounts for the feed-water valve
dynamics and 1/(1 + 𝑇
ℎ
𝑠) accounts for the water mass trans-
portation dynamics: their values are reported in Table 1.
The exiting steam-water mass 𝑄
𝐺𝑉
is proportional to 𝑄V:
𝑄
𝐺𝑉
(𝑠) =
(1 − 𝐹
𝑔
𝑇
𝑔
𝑠)
(1 + 𝑇
𝑔
𝑠)
𝑄V (𝑠) , (3)
where the first-order lag 1/(1 + 𝑇
𝑔
𝑠) accounts for the elapsed
time from the turbine steamdemand and the increase of𝑄
𝐺𝑉
,
and the nonminimumphase term (1−𝐹
𝑔
𝑇
𝑔
𝑠) accounts for the
two-phase swell and shrink effects.
Combining (1), (2), and (3),𝑁rl is equal to
𝑁rl (𝑠)
=
1
𝑇
𝑛
𝑠
(
𝑄
𝑒
(𝑠)
(1 + 𝑇
ℎ
𝑠) (1 + 𝜏𝑠)
−
(1 − 𝐹
𝑔
𝑇
𝑔
𝑠)
(1 + 𝑇
𝑔
𝑠)
𝑄V (𝑠))
(4)
and𝑊rl, that is, the overall water mass in the steam generator,
is
𝑊rl (𝑠) =
1
𝑇int𝑠
(𝑄
𝑒
(𝑠) − 𝑄V (𝑠)) , (5)
where𝑇int is a time constant that accounts for the𝑊rl dynam-
ics.
We assume 𝑦
1
= 𝑁rl and 𝑦2 = 𝑊rl, and 𝑢 = 𝑄𝑒 and 𝑑 =
𝑄V; the state space representation of the SG model is, thus,
?̇? (𝑡) =
(
(
(
(
(
(
0 0 0
1
𝑇
𝑛
0 −
1
𝑇
ℎ
0 −
1
𝑇
𝑛
0 0 −
1
𝑇
𝑔
0
0 0 0 −
1
𝜏
)
)
)
)
)
)
x (𝑡)
+(
(
0
0
0
1
𝜏
)
)
u (𝑡) +((
(
−
1
𝑇
𝑛
0
1 + 𝐹
𝑔
𝑇
𝑛
0
)
)
)
d (𝑡) ,
𝑦 (𝑡) = (
1 1 1 0
𝑇
𝑛
𝑇int
0 0
𝜏
𝑇int
) x (𝑡) .
(6)
The values of the parameters 𝑇
ℎ
, 𝑇
𝑛
, 𝐹
𝑔
,𝜏, 𝑇
𝑔
, and 𝑇int change
depending on the power 𝑃
𝑜
, as shown in Table 1.
The goal of the system is to maintain the SG water level
at a reference position (𝑁ref): the SG fails if the 𝑁rl rises
(falls) above (below) the threshold 𝑁high (𝑁low), in which
case automatic reactor or turbine trips are triggered. Indeed,
if the 𝑁rl exceeds 𝑁high, the steam separator and dryer
lose their functionality and excessive moisture is carried in
𝑄V, degrading the turbine blades profile and the turbine
efficiency; if 𝑁rl decreases below 𝑁low, insufficient cooling
capability of the primary fluid occurs. Similarly, the 𝑊rl is
relevant for the cooling capability of the primary circuit [28].
Prealarms are triggered when𝑁rl exceeds𝑁ℎ𝑙 (𝑁𝑙𝑙) if a small
deviation from 𝑁ref occurs or when 𝑁rl exceeds 𝑁Vℎ (𝑁V𝑙),
when the deviation is large. Set points of 𝑁ref and of 𝑁rl
depend on𝑃
𝑜
, as shown in Figure 2, and, thus, also the alarms
thresholds depend on 𝑃
𝑜
. The𝑁rl set point is low at low 𝑃𝑜, to
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Table 1: Parameters of the UTSG model at different power levels [27].
𝑃
𝑜
0.03 × 𝑃
𝑛
0.04 × 𝑃
𝑛
0.09 × 𝑃
𝑛
0.24 × 𝑃
𝑛
0.30 × 𝑃
𝑛
0.50 × 𝑃
𝑛
𝑃
𝑛
𝑇
𝑛
36 56 63 44 40 40 40
𝐹
𝑔
13 18 10 4 4 4 4
𝑇
ℎ
170 56 30 10 8 5 5
𝜏 10 10 10 30 30 30 30
𝑇
𝑔
10 10 10 10 10 10 10
𝑇int 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
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Figure 2: Set point for𝑁rl at different power rate 𝑃𝑜 values.
partially account for the strong inverse response of 𝑁rl [28];
thus, the low level thresholds are more restrictive than the
high level thresholds at low 𝑃
𝑜
.
A dedicated model has been implemented in SIMULINK
to simulate the dynamic response of the UTSG at different
𝑃
𝑜
values. Both feedforward and feedback digital control
schemes have been adopted.The feedback controller is a PID
that provides a flow rate 𝑄pid resulting from the residuals
between 𝑁rl and 𝑁ref, whereas the feedforward controller
operates a safety relief valve that is opened if and only if 𝑁rl
exceeds the𝑁
ℎ𝑙
and removes a constant flow safety flow rate
(𝑄sf). The block diagram representing the SIMULINKmodel
of the SG is shown in Figure 3: the controlled variable is𝑁rl,
whereas the control variable is 𝑄
𝑒
.
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2.2. The Set of Possible Failures. The set of multiple compo-
nent failures that can occur during the system life are shown
in Figure 4.
(1) The outlet steam valve can fail stuck at a random time
in [0, 4000] (s) in three different positions: (i) closed;
(ii) stuck open at 50% of the nominal 𝑄V that should
be provided at 𝑃
𝑜
; (iii) stuck open at 150% of the
nominal 𝑄V that should be provided at 𝑃𝑜.
(2) The safety relief valve can fail stuck at a random time
in [0, 4000] (s) at a uniform random value 𝑄sf in the
range [0.5, 50.5] (kg/s).
(3) The communication between the sensor that moni-
tors 𝑁rl and the PID controller can fail at random
times in [0, 4000] (s), in which case the PID is pro-
vided with the same input value of the previous time
step.
(4) The PID controller can fail stuck at random times in
[0, 4000] (s), providing a uniform random flow rate
𝑄pid belonging to [−18, 18]% of the nominal 𝑄𝑒 that
should be provided at 𝑃
𝑜
.
It is worth noticing that in the UTSG there are two PID con-
trollers and, thus, two communications between the sensors
measuring 𝑁rl and the PIDs (one for high power feedback
control and the other for low power feedback control).
The selective action of the PIDs depending on 𝑃
𝑜
hides
some of the failures. For example, if the power profile of the
scenario under investigation is a ramp, both PIDs are called in
operation: if anyone (or both) failed, their fault state is
detectable. On the contrary, if we consider scenarios with
constant power profile, for example, low power rate (𝑃
𝑜
<
15% 𝑃
𝑛
), the occurrence of a high power feedback control
failure cannot be detected, and, thus, the fault remains
hidden.
Choices and hypotheses formodeling the failures (i.e., the
mission time, the number and type of faults, the distributions
of failure times, and magnitudes) have been arbitrarily made
with the aim of generating multiple failures in the sequences
and capturing the dynamic influence of their order, timing,
and magnitude. The choice of a mission time (𝑇miss) equal to
4000 (s) has beenmade, because it is a long enough interval of
time to allow the complete development also of slow dynamic
accident scenarios.
2.3. The Multistate Representation of System Dynamics. For
realistically treating the dynamic behavior of the UTSGwhen
component failures occur, we go beyond the binary state
representation and adopt a multiple value logic (MVL) [17,
32] for an approximated description of the continuous time of
occurrence of component failures and their magnitude. The
MVL allows describing that the components can fail at any
(discrete) time (not only the initial time) along the scenario,
with different (discrete) magnitudes (not only the most
conservative). The discretization of the time and magnitudes
values is as follows:
(i) time discretization: we use the labels 𝑡mvl = 1, 𝑡mvl =
2, 𝑡mvl = 3, and 𝑡mvl = 4, for failures occurring
in the intervals [0, 1000] (s), [1001, 2000] (s), [2001,
3000] (s), and [3001, 4000] (s), respectively; if the
label 𝑡mvl = 0, the component does not fail within the
time of the whole scenario, 𝑇miss;
(ii) magnitude discretization:
(a) the steam valve magnitude is indicated as 1, 2,
or 3 for failure states corresponding to stuck at
0%, stuck at 50%, and stuck at 150% of the 𝑄
𝑒
value that should be provided at𝑃
𝑜
, respectively;
if the steam valve magnitude is indicated as 0,
the component does not fail in 𝑇miss;
(b) the safety relief valve fails with magnitude
indicated as 1, 2, 3, and 4, if it is stuck between
[0.5, 12.6] (kg/s), (12.6, 25.27] (kg/s), (25.27,
37.91] (kg/s), and (37.91, 50.5] (kg/s), respec-
tively; if the safety relief valve magnitude is
indicated as 0, the component does not fail in
𝑇miss;
(c) the communication between the sensormeasur-
ing𝑁rl and the PID controller is labelled 0 if the
communication works, 1 otherwise;
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Figure 5: Sequence vector representing a scenario.
Table 2: System configurations.
System
configurations
Failure of the
outlet steam valve
Failure of the
safety relief valve
Level sensor-PID controller
communication interruption
Failure of the
PID controller
1 — — — —
2 X — — —
3 — X — —
4 — — X —
5 — — — X
6 X X — —
7 X — X —
8 X — — X
9 — X X —
10 — X — X
11 — — X X
12 X X X —
13 X X — X
14 X — X X
15 — X X X
16 X X X X
(d) the PID controller failure magnitude range is
discretized into 8 equally spaced magnitude
intervals, labelled from 1 to 8, representative of
failure states corresponding to discrete intervals
of output value belonging to [−18, 18]% of the
𝑄
𝑒
value that should be provided at𝑃
𝑜
; if the PID
controller magnitude is labelled as 0, the com-
ponent does not fail in 𝑇miss.
The values of time and magnitude and order of failure
occurrence for each component are included into a sequence
vector that represents a scenario. As an example, the sequence
vector of Figure 5 represents a scenario where the steam
valve fails stuck at its maximum allowable value at a time in
[3001, 4000] (s) and it is the third event occurring along the
sequence; the safety relief valve fails first in [0, 1000] (s), with
a magnitude belonging to [0.5, 12.6] (kg/s); the communica-
tion between the sensormeasuring𝑁rl and the PID controller
is the second failure event in the sequence and occurs in
[2001, 3000] (s); finally, the PID controller fails stuck in
[3001, 4000] (s), with a magnitude belonging to [6, 10]% of
the 𝑄
𝑒
value that should be provided at 𝑃
𝑜
.
The number of possible sequence vectors that arise
from the MVL discretization is 100509, each one evolving
towards either safe or faulty conditions. To investigate this,
a Monte Carlo-driven fault injection engine is used to sample
combinations of discrete times and discrete magnitudes of
components failures.
The (dynamic) analysis has been performed with respect
to the two constant power scenarios, 5% 𝑃
𝑛
(low power level)
and 80% 𝑃
𝑛
(high power level). The system configurations
considered are listed in Table 2.
The dynamic analysis shows that the same combination
of components failures does not unequivocally lead to only
one system end state but rather it depends on when the
failures occur and with what magnitude. This is shown in
Figure 6, where the frequencies of occurrence of the three
system end states (“High,” “Safe,” and “Low”) are plotted for
the 16 dynamic system configurations of Table 2.
Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 7
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Configuration
Fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s
Low level
Safe
High level
(a)
Low level
Safe
High level
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Configuration
Fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s
(b)
Figure 6: Histograms for high power level (a) and low power level (b) of the frequencies of occurrence of the end states for each of the 16
system configurations of Table 2, simulated by sampling discrete failure times and magnitudes of components failures.
Figure 7 shows that, at high power operation, the timing
of the events is quite important, becausewith the same system
configuration but different times of failure occurrences, the
system end state change. Specifically, in Figure 7(a), the safety
valve fails stuck at 100%of𝑄sf after 1020 seconds and the com-
munication between the sensor measuring 𝑁rl and the PID
controller fails at
(i) 1052 seconds (solid line),
(ii) 1063 seconds (dashed-dotted line).
The two scenarios lead to low and high failure modes, respec-
tively, whereas they would be considered as minimal cuts sets
(MCS) in a static reliability analysis presented inAppendix A.
Figure 7(b) shows the effects of different failures magni-
tudes on the system end state: the safety relief valve fails stuck
in itsmaximumposition at 2000 seconds, the communication
fails at 2010 seconds, and the PID controller fails at 2020
seconds with two different magnitudes:
(i) magnitude equal to 13% of the nominal 𝑄
𝑒
value that
should be provided at 80% 𝑃
𝑛
(dashed-dotted line),
(ii) magnitude equal to 12% of the nominal 𝑄
𝑒
value that
should be provided at 80% 𝑃
𝑛
(solid line).
The low power scenarios also present dynamic effects, as
shown in Figure 8. In particular, Figure 8(a) shows the effects
of the timing on the system end state: the safety relief valve
fails stuck at𝑄sf = 50.5 (kg/s) at 1005 (s) and the steam output
valve fails stuck at 150% of the nominal 𝑄V value that should
be provided at 5% 𝑃
𝑛
at
(i) 1046 seconds (dashed-dotted line),
(ii) 1047 seconds (solid line).
Figure 8(b) shows the effects of the order of components fail-
ure occurrence on the system end state: the safety relief valve
fails stuck at 𝑄sf = 50.5 (kg/s) and the PID controller fails
stuck at its minimum allowable value.
(i) The PID controller failure is the first failure event
along the sequence of events (dashed-dotted line).
(ii) The safety relief valve failure is the first failure event
along the sequence of events (solid line).
Hereafter, without loss of generality, among the system
configurations of Table 2, we focus only on the classification
of the PIs and Near Misses of the high level failure mode at
high power level (𝑃
𝑜
= 80% 𝑃
𝑛
).
3. Near Misses Identification
The Near Misses identification is here treated as a classifica-
tion problem, in which Near Misses are sorted out from the
safe scenarios, among the whole set of accidental transients
simulated. In practice, the PIs are first identified among the
whole set of 100509 possible scenarios and, then, the Near
Misses are separated out among the remaining safe scenarios.
3.1. Prime Implicants Identification. A PI is a set of variables
that represents a minimal combination of accident com-
ponent failures necessary for system failure and cannot be
covered by amore reduced implicant [17, 18]. Note that in our
case the “PIs” identification task may consider noncoherent
structure functions, for which both failed and working states
of the same components can lead the system to failure. In
such circumstances, traditional methods, for example, based
on minimal cut sets analysis, cannot be applied, whereas
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Figure 7: Example of dynamic system behavior at 80% 𝑃
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Figure 8: Example of dynamic system behavior at 5% 𝑃
𝑛
.
dynamic reliability methods need to be applied for the
identification of the PIs [33, 34].
The PIs identification among the whole set of 100509 pos-
sible scenarios is performed bymeans of the visual interactive
method presented in [34]. The basic idea it relies on is that
PIs are those scenarios with as few as possible events that are
capable of leading the system into a failure state [35]; then, we
first select as most important feature for the PIs identification
the literal cost of the sequence vector (i.e., the number
of components whose behavior is specified in the accident
sequence) and then the accident sequences associated with
the lowest literal cost are selected and stored as PIs. In fact,
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Figure 9: Probability function 𝑝(𝑡) for the definition of risk.
these are the most reduced sequences (i.e., with least number
of events) that cannot be covered by any other implicant, and,
thus, these are PIs by definition. The selected PIs and the
implicants covered by them are deleted from the set of impli-
cants and the procedure is repeated for the remaining impli-
cants until all are covered. By so doing, 1255 PIs are identified
for the high level failure mode, covering 36128 minterms.
The total computational time approximately required for the
identification of the PIs is 780 (s) on an Intel Core 2 Duo
T9300 CPU @2.50GHz.
3.2. The “Forward” Classification. Once the (1255) PIs for
the SG high level failure mode have been identified, they
are removed from the set of all possible scenarios, which is
left with 64381 safe scenarios. For the identification of Near
Misses among these, we resort to their definition as sequences
of failure events that indeed keep the system in a safe
condition but endangered (i.e., a quasifault system state). To
this aim, we introduce a risk-based characterization of these
remaining scenarios, calculating their associated risk, at each
time instant 𝑡, as [23]
Risk (𝑡) = 𝑝 (𝑡) × 𝑐 (𝑡) , (7)
where 𝑝(𝑡) is the probability that at time 𝑡 the scenario can
lead the system into an accidental scenario and 𝑐(𝑡) is the
consequence that the developing scenario would cause to the
system.
In this view, we build a functional relationship such that𝑝
increases as 𝑁rl moves further away from the reference level
𝑁ref, in a way that 𝑝 = 0 if 𝑁rl is equal to 𝑁ref and 𝑝 = 1
if 𝑁rl reaches 𝑁high. Such relationship is given in (8) below,
assuming that scenarios whose 𝑁rl(𝑡) approaches 𝑁high are
more prone to failure than those with 𝑁rl(𝑡) close to 𝑁ref;
that is, (8) “filters out” (i.e., neglects) scenarios whose𝑁rl(𝑡) is
close to𝑁ref and “mines” (i.e., weighs more) scenarios whose
𝑁rl(𝑡) is close to𝑁high:
𝑝 (𝑡) = 𝜑(
𝑁rl (𝑡) − (𝜇 + 5𝜎)
𝜎
)
= ∫
𝑁rl(𝑡)
𝑁ref
1
√2𝜋𝜎
𝑒
(𝑁rl(𝑡)−(𝜇+5𝜎))
2
/2𝜎
2
𝑑𝑁rl,
(8)
where 𝜑 is the cumulative probability function of the Gaus-
sian distribution with mean 𝜇 = 𝑁ref, and standard deviation
𝜎 = (𝑁high − 𝑁ref)/5. Figure 9 shows the trend of 𝑝(𝑡).
The consequence 𝑐(𝑡) of a scenario increases as 𝑁rl
approaches the failure threshold 𝑁high, and 𝑐(𝑡) can be
calculated at time 𝑡 as [23]
𝑐 (𝑡) = 𝐴
(NRL(𝑡)−(𝜇+3𝜎))/(NRL(𝑡)−𝜇)
, (9)
where 𝐴 is the intensity coefficient that accounts for the
closeness of 𝑁rl to the thresholds 𝑁ℎ𝑙, 𝑁Vℎ, and 𝑁high, and
for the exceedance time between the first event of the failure
sequence (hereafter called initiating event (IE)) and the time
of exceeding the threshold: the shorter this time, the more
critical the scenario. Thus, the larger 𝐴 is, the faster and
closer 𝑁rl approaches a threshold; we assume 𝐴 = 100 (no
consequences) if no threshold is exceeded; 𝐴 = 200 (low
consequences) if𝑁rl exceeds𝑁ℎ𝑙 after at least 2001 (s) from IE
or if 𝑁rl exceeds 𝑁Vℎ after at least 3001 (s) from IE; 𝐴 = 300
(medium consequences) if 𝑁rl exceeds 𝑁ℎ𝑙 within 2000 (s)
from IE, if 𝑁rl exceeds 𝑁Vℎ and the elapsed time is in
[1001, 3000] (s), and if𝑁rl exceeds𝑁high after at least 2001 (s)
from IE; 𝐴 = 400 (catastrophic consequences) if𝑁rl exceeds
𝑁Vℎ within 1000 (s) from IE or if 𝑁rl exceeds 𝑁high and the
elapsed time from IE is in [1, 2000] (s). A matrix representa-
tion of the intensity coefficient is shown in Figure 10.
By so doing, the available 64381 remaining safe scenarios
are fully described at each time instant 𝑡 = 1, 2, . . . , 4000 [s]
by their values of probability 𝑝(𝑡), consequence 𝑐(𝑡), and
overall risk 𝑟(𝑡). An example of the 𝑝(𝑡), 𝑐(𝑡), and 𝑟(𝑡)
evolutions for two generic trends of 𝑁rl(𝑡) is shown in
Figure 11. More specifically, the 𝑁rl(𝑡) behaviors represented
in Figure 11(a) are due to
(i) solid line: the PID controller fails at 100 (s) with
magnitude 4 and the safety relief valve fails at 190 (s)
with magnitude 2;
(ii) dashed-dotted line: the safety relief valve fails at
100 (s)withmagnitude 1, the communication between
the sensor measuring 𝑁rl and the PID controller is
interrupted at 136 (s), and the PID controller fails at
3917 (s) with magnitude 5.
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Figure 11: Probability 𝑝(𝑡), consequences 𝑐(𝑡), and risk 𝑟(𝑡) for two sequences of events.
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It is worth analysing the behavior of 𝑝(𝑡), 𝑐(𝑡), and, thus,
𝑟(𝑡) (Figures 11(b), 11(c), and 11(d), resp.): all three above-
mentioned functions increase as 𝑁rl(𝑡) moves further away
from 𝑁ref and decrease as 𝑁rl(𝑡) approaches 𝑁ref. The steps
shown in the consequences and risk plots (around 800 [s] for
the solid line scenario and around 3500 [s] for the dashed-
dotted line scenario) are due to the change of the discrete
consequence intensity coefficient 𝐴 along the scenarios. The
solid line scenario is faster than the dashed-dotted line
scenario (upper plot) and, thus, the value of the parameters𝐴
for the former scenario is 400 (catastrophic consequences, see
Figure 10), due to the fact that 𝑁rl(𝑡) exceeds 𝑁Vℎ within
1000 (s), whereas, 𝐴 = 300 (medium consequences, see
Figure 10) for the dashed-dotted scenarios, because 𝑁rl(𝑡)
exceeds 𝑁Vℎ within [1001, 3000] (s). Thus, the solid line sce-
nario is more abrupt in its development towards failure and
expected to have more catastrophic consequences, and, thus,
more overall risk, than the dashed-dotted scenario, because
the time between IE and the exceedance of 𝑁Vℎ is shorter
(i.e, less grace time).
3.2.1. Features Selection. The identification of theNearMisses
is treated as an unsupervised classification problem and
addressed by clustering, where (i) the number of clusters is
unknown and (ii) the features that enable the best clustering
according to the risk-based characteristic profiles of 𝑝(𝑡),
𝑐(𝑡), and 𝑟(𝑡) of the accidental scenarios are unknown.
Unsupervised clustering, thus, entails identifying the number
𝐾 of clusters in which similar scenarios can be grouped
according to similar values of some scenario features. To do
this, from the profiles 𝑝(𝑡), 𝑐(𝑡), and 𝑟(𝑡), we extract some
statistical indicators as features [36]:
(1) mean value:
𝜇
𝑛
=
1
𝑇miss
𝑁
∑
𝑡=1
𝑛 (𝑡) , (10)
(2) peak value:
max = max
𝑡=1,2,...,𝑇miss
𝑛 (𝑡) , (11)
(3) standard deviation:
𝜎
𝑛
= √
1
𝑇miss − 1
𝑇miss
∑
𝑡=1
(𝑛 (𝑡) − 𝜇)
2
, (12)
(4) root mean square:
RMS = √ 1
𝑇miss
𝑇miss
∑
𝑡=1
(𝑛 (𝑡))
2
, (13)
(5) skewness:
SK =
∑
𝑇miss
𝑡=1
(𝑛 (𝑡) − 𝜇)
3
𝑇miss − 1
, (14)
18 features
MBDE
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Subset of
candidate
features
Performance
evaluation
Optimal
features
K-means 
clustering
Figure 12: Wrapper approach for optimal feature subset selection
based on a MBDE optimization algorithm and a𝐾-means classifier.
(6) kurtosis:
KU =
∑
𝑇miss
𝑡=1
(𝑛 (𝑡) − 𝜇)
4
𝑇miss − 1
, (15)
where 𝑛(𝑡) is alternatively equal to 𝑝(𝑡), 𝑐(𝑡), and 𝑟(𝑡) and,
thus, the total number of features is equal to 6 × 3 = 18.
Among these 18 available features, we search for those that are
optimal for clustering the 64381 scenarios in NearMisses and
safe scenarios.
We resort to a wrapper framework [37, 38], whereby a
modified binary differential evolution (MBDE) search engine
[33, 39] searches candidate groups of features sets that are
fed to a 𝐾-means clustering algorithm [40]; eventually, the
wrapper evolves so that among these candidate groups, the
group retained is that which makes the 𝐾-means clustering
algorithmperformbest (most compact and separate clusters).
The idea behind the wrapper approach is shown in Figure 12.
During the features search byMBDE, the𝐾-means clustering
is run on the𝑁 = 0.80×64381 = 51505 (training) safe scenar-
ios with sets of features (𝐹) that are randomly selected by the
MBDE algorithm.The optimal number (𝐾) of clusters is also
unknown and it is determined by looking at the clustering
performance obtained by the 𝐾-means with reference to the
Calinski-Harabasz (CH) index [41], which accounts for the
ratio of the overall between-cluster variance (separation) and
the overall within-cluster variance (compactness).The search
proceeds iteratively until the CH index is maximised and the
number of clusters𝐾 is fixed.Then, the results of the wrapper
algorithm are evaluated on an independent test set (𝑇set), that
is, the 0.2 × 643281 = 12876 safe scenarios that have been left
out during the training phase.
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The CH index for a number 𝐾 of clusters, 𝑘 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝐾
is equal to [41]
CH =
𝑆𝑆
𝑏
𝑆𝑆
𝑤
×
(𝑁 × 𝐹) − 𝐾
𝐾 − 1
, (16)
where 𝑆𝑆
𝑏
is the overall between-cluster variance:
𝑆𝑆
𝑏
=
𝐾
∑
𝑘=1
𝑛
𝑘
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩𝑚𝑘 − 𝑚
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩
2
, (17)
and 𝑆𝑆
𝑤
is the overall within-cluster variance:
𝑆𝑆
𝑤
=
𝐾
∑
𝑘=1
∑
𝑥∈𝑘
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩𝑥𝑐 − 𝑚𝑘
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩
2
, (18)
where 𝑛
𝑘
is the number of scenarios 𝑥
𝑐
assigned to the 𝑘th
cluster,𝑚
𝑘
is the centroid of the 𝑘th cluster, that is, the mean
of the selected features belonging to the 𝑘th cluster, 𝑚 is the
mean of the selected features, and ‖𝑚
𝑘
− 𝑚‖
2 and ‖𝑥
𝑐
− 𝑚
𝑘
‖
2
are the 𝐿2 norms, that is, Euclidean distances, between the
two vectors.
The optimal features selection provides as best features
the standard deviation of 𝑐(𝑡), the standard deviation of 𝑟(𝑡),
and the root mean square of 𝑟(𝑡); the best performance is
obtained with CH = 9.35𝑒 + 04 and𝐾 = 5.
3.2.2. The Clustering Results. The 𝐾 = 5 obtained clusters of
the safe scenarios are shown in Figure 13 with reference to
the features of mean risk (𝜇risk) and time elapsed from the
instant 𝑡risk at which 𝑟(𝑡) starts to deviate from zero, that is,
the time interval during which the system is exposed to risk.
The rationale behind this choice is that the larger 𝜇risk and the
longer 𝑡risk, the more dangerous the scenarios. In Figure 13,
clusters 3, 4, and 5 (triangles, crosses, and squares, resp.) are
well separated, that is, the low level risk scenarios clusters
are widened by the adoption of (8) for the quantification
of the risk profile 𝑟(𝑡). It is possible to distinguish the
scenarios having the lowest risk level from the scenarios
having low risk level, and, thus, the highest risk scenarios
are well separated from the lower risk scenarios. The good
performance obtained when (8) is adopted instead of other
𝑝(𝑡) profiles, for example, linear probability function (𝑝(𝑡) ∝
𝑁rl(𝑡)) that would give the same importance to any level
𝑁rl, for the quantification of the risk profile 𝑟(𝑡), is due to
the fact that (8) “filters out” (i.e., neglects) scenarios whose
𝑁rl(𝑡) is close to𝑁ref and “mines” (i.e., weighsmore) scenarios
whose 𝑁rl(𝑡) is close to 𝑁high: the 332 circles in Figure 13
(listed in Appendix B) can, thus, be considered the Near
Misses scenarios, that is, scenarios that incidentally keep the
system into safe state, although in endangered and insecure
operational conditions.
3.3. The “Backward” Approach. Once the Near Misses for the
SG high level failure mode have been identified by clustering,
we can search for similarities among them in terms of their
multiple value sequences, that is, order and timing of event
occurrences and deterministic process variables values. This
“Backward” approach can lead us to finding the minimum
conditions, that is, minimum 𝜇risk and minimum 𝑡risk, that
lead the system into a quasifault state. The problem can be
framed as amultiobjective optimization problem (MOP) [42]
that looks for the set of scenarios x to dominate any other
scenarios with respect to the fitness function 𝑓:
𝑓 (𝑥) = [𝑓
1
(𝜇risk) , 𝑓2 (𝑡risk)] , (19)
where 𝑓
1
and 𝑓
2
are the objectives functions of the defined
MOP, that is, minimum 𝜇risk and 𝑡risk, respectively. The solu-
tion of the MOP of (19) is the Pareto set shown in Figure 14,
where 12 solutions are plotted (squares lined by continuous
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line) and listed in Table 3. These scenarios x of minimum
𝑓(𝑥) are expected to cover all failure of NearMisses scenarios
cluster.
The coverage can be verified by, first, identifying the most
similar characteristics of the sequence vectors belonging to
the Near Misses cluster with the Pareto set scenarios x, and,
then, by solving a set covering problem (SCP) [43, 44].
The most similar characteristics can be computed by
coverage vectors (one for each scenario belonging to x): this
entails calculating the Hamming distance [45] between each
sequence vectors in x and each one of the other sequence
vectors in the Near Misses cluster [46]. The entries of the
coverage vector (in our case twelve entries, one for time,
magnitude, and order of occurrence of each component
failure; see Figure 5) are increased if the Hamming distance
between one same entry of the considered scenario belonging
to x and of the Near Misses vectors is equal to zero, as shown,
without loss of generality, in Figure 15 for 1 sequence vector
of x and only 2 Near Misses vectors.
Table 4 lists the 12 coverage vectors, where each entry
is the percentage of Near Misses vectors having the same
stochastic behavior of the optimal set x shown in Table 3. It
can be seen that, for each scenario belonging to x, columns 8,
11, and 12 (e.g., sensor-PID communication failure magni-
tude, PID failure magnitude, and PID order of failure, resp.)
have the largest values of the coverage vectors: this means
that the majority of the sequence vectors of the Near Misses
clusters can be well represented by (only) these failures.
Furthermore, the analysis of the MVL values of the scenarios
belonging to x (Table 3) where the largest coverage values of
these columns are registered (i.e, 87%, 98.5%, and 85.2% for
columns 8, 11, and 12, resp.) highlights that these failures are
characterized by the same MVL values that can be summa-
rized as follows:
(i) the failure of the communication between the sensor
monitoring the𝑁rl and the PID controller;
(ii) the failure of the PID controller with magnitude
belonging to [−5, −1]% of the𝑄
𝑒
value that should be
provided at 𝑃
𝑜
, that is, magnitude equal to 4 in MVL
framework, and it is the first accident occurring along
the sequence of events in over 85% of the NearMisses
scenarios.
A SCP can, thus, be solved for verifying that these latest
characteristics are the minimum set of stochastic event
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Steam valve fails
stuck open at
nominal flow rate
PID controller fails
stuck at the minimum
value at the
beginning of the
mission time
High level
failure mode
150% of the
Q
Figure 16: Fault tree for the high level failure mode.
Table 5: Possible system configurations to be considered in the static reliability analysis with constant power profile.
System
configurations
Failure of the
outlet steam valve
Failure of the
safety relief valve
Level sensor-PID controller
communication interruption
Failure of the
PID controller
1 — — — —
2 X — — —
3 — X — —
4 — — X —
5 — — — X
6 X X — —
7 X — X —
8 X — — X
9 — X X —
10 — X — X
11 X X X —
12 X X — X
occurrences and deterministic process variables values of x
that exhaustively describe the scenarios belonging to theNear
Misses cluster: if a NearMiss sequence vector is characterized
by (at least) one of the common characteristics, this is covered
by the optimal set x. In the present application we have
verified that all the scenarios belonging to the identified Near
Misses cluster are covered by the minimal conditions that
lead the system into a quasifault state, that is, the optimal
set x. In conclusion, the occurrence of one of the common
characteristics listed above is sufficient to lead the system into
endangered and insecure operational conditions.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, a risk-based clustering approach for Near
Misses identification has been proposed. The approach
includes a risk-based feature selection task,where by each safe
scenario it is described in terms of probability, consequence,
and overall risk. The optimal features set is identified by
a wrapper approach based on the combination of a MBDE
algorithm with 𝐾-means clustering. The characteristics of
the Near Misses scenarios are, then, identified solving a
multiobjective optimization problem and Hamming distance
as a measure of similarity.
The application of the approach to a case study of IDPSA
of a UTSG has shown the possibility of retrieving relevant
information for risk monitoring.
Appendices
A. Static Reliability Analysis
For a static reliability analysis of the UTSG, we conservatively
assume that component failures occur at the beginning of
the scenario, with magnitudes equal to their extreme (either
maximumorminimum) plausible values [19].We analyze the
dynamic response of the system at constant 𝑃
𝑜
values (𝑃
𝑜
=
5% 𝑃
𝑛
and 𝑃
𝑜
= 80% 𝑃
𝑛
) and identify the minimal cuts sets
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Figure 17:𝑁rl evolution when the PID controller output is stuck at time 𝑡 = 0 at the minimum allowable value of −18% of nominal 𝑄𝑒 that
should be provided at 5% 𝑃
𝑛
(a) and at 80% 𝑃
𝑛
(b).
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Figure 18:𝑁rl evolution when the steam valve fails stuck at time 𝑡 = 0 at the maximum allowable value of 150% of nominal 𝑄V that should
be provided at 5% 𝑃
𝑛
(a) and at 80% 𝑃
𝑛
(b).
(MCS) with respect to the low and high level failure modes.
Considering the binary, safe or faulty, states of the 6 compo-
nents (component state is 0 if it works and 1 if it is failed),
the number of possible system configurations is equal to 26.
However, many configurations are not detectable in constant
power scenarios, for example, simultaneous occurrence of
low and high power communication failures, whereas some
others are not important when event occurrence timing is not
considered; for example, PID and communication failures
occur simultaneously, because, in this case, the feedback
control output would always be the same as a stand-alone
PID failure. Thus, the possible system configurations to be
18 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations
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Figure 19: (a) 𝑁rl evolution when the safety relief valve fails stuck with 𝑄sf = 50.5 (kg/s); (b) the steam valve fails stuck closed; (c) the PID
controller fails stuck at 18% of nominal 𝑄
𝑒
that should be provided at 5% 𝑃
𝑛
.
considered in a static analysis with constant power is equal
to 12 for each power level (Table 5).
To identify the system MCS, the different system config-
urations of Table 5 have been simulated by the SIMULINK
model, at low and at high (constant) power levels. It turns
out that the MCSs for the high level failure mode are the
same at both power levels (Figure 16): the failures of the PID
controller at its minimum values (i.e., −18% of the nominal
𝑄
𝑒
that should be provided at 𝑃
𝑜
) and of the steam valve at
its maximum value (i.e., 150% of the nominal 𝑄V value that
should be provided at 𝑃
𝑜
) are two first-order MCS. The 𝑁rl
evolutions when these MCSs occur are shown in Figures 17
and 18.
The analysis of the low level failure mode provides
different MCSs at different 𝑃
𝑜
. At 5% 𝑃
𝑛
, there are three
first-order MCSs represented by the following: (i) safety
valve fails stuck at the maximum allowable value: that is,
𝑄sf = 50.5 (kg/s); (ii) steam valve fails stuck closed; (iii) PID
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Safety valve fails
stuck open at
maximum position
at the beginning of
the mission time
PID controller fails 
stuck at the maximum
value at the
beginning of the
mission time
Low level
failure mode
Steam valve fails
stuck close at the
beginning of the
mission time
Figure 20: Fault tree for the low level failure mode at low power.
controller fails stuck at its maximum values, (i.e., 18% of the
nominal 𝑄
𝑒
value that should be provided at 5% 𝑃
𝑛
). The𝑁rl
evolution when these MCSs occur and the relative FT are
shown in Figures 19 and 20, respectively.
At 80% 𝑃
𝑛
, three MCSs are found: (i) a second-order
MCS that combines the failure of the safety relief valve at
its maximum allowable value: that is, 𝑄sf = 50.5 (kg/s), and
the failure of the communication, (ii) the steam valve failure
in a closed position, and (iii) the PID controller fails at its
maximumvalue (i.e., 18% of the nominal𝑄
𝑒
value that should
be provided at 80% 𝑃
𝑛
). The𝑁rl evolution when these MCSs
occur and the relative FT are shown in Figures 21 and 22,
respectively.
B. Near Misses Sequence Vector Scenarios
See Table 6.
Abbreviations
CET: Continuous event tree
CH: Calinski-Harabasz index
DBA: Design basis accident
DET: Dynamic event tree
DSA: Deterministic safety analysis
ET: Event tree
FT: Fault tree
IDPSA: Integrated deterministic and probabilistic
safety analysis
IE: Initiating event
MBDE: Modified binary differential evolution
MCS: Minimal cuts set
MOP: Multiobjective optimization problem
MVL: Multiple-valued logic
NPP: Nuclear power plant
PIs: Prime implicants
PSA: Probabilistic safety analysis
SCP: Set covering problem
SG: Steam generator
TH: Thermal-hydraulics
UTSG: U-tube steam generator.
Symbols
𝑝: Probability that the developing scenario is an
accidental scenario
𝑐: Consequence that the developing scenario can
cause to the system
𝑟: Overall risk of the developing scenario
𝑡: Time instant
𝑝(𝑡): Probability that at time 𝑡 the scenario can lead
the system into an accidental scenario
𝑐(𝑡): Consequence that at time 𝑡 the developing
scenario is predicted to cause to the system
𝑟(𝑡): Overall risk of the developing scenario at time 𝑡
𝑄
𝑒
: Flow rate of fresh feed-water entering the
steam generator
𝑃
𝑜
: Operating power
𝑃
𝑛
: Nominal power
𝑄V: Flow rate of dry steam exiting the steam
generator
𝑁rl: Narrow range steam generator water level
𝑊rl: Wide range steam generator water level
𝑇
𝑛
: Time constant for the𝑁rl dynamics
𝑄
𝑒𝑓
: Flow rate of incoming water in steam generator
tube bundle region
𝑇
ℎ
: Time constant for the water mass
transportation dynamics
𝜏: Time constant for the feed-water valve
dynamics
𝑄
𝐺𝑉
: Flow rate of steam-water mixture exiting the
steam generator tube bundle region
𝑇
𝑔
: Time constant for the dynamics relating 𝑄
𝑉
to
𝑄
𝐺𝑉
𝐹
𝑔
: Constant in the nonminimum phase term of
the dynamics relating 𝑄
𝑉
to 𝑄
𝐺𝑉
𝑇int: Time constant for the𝑊rl dynamics
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Table 6
Near Miss 𝑇
𝑠
𝑀
𝑠
𝑂
𝑠
𝑇
𝑠𝑎
𝑀
𝑠𝑎
𝑂
𝑠𝑎
𝑇
𝑐
𝑀
𝑐
𝑂
𝑐
𝑇
𝑝
𝑀
𝑝
𝑂
𝑝
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 1
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 2
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 4 1
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 4 2
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 4 1
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 3 4 2
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 2 2 4 1
8 0 0 0 2 2 2 4 1 3 2 4 1
9 0 0 0 2 3 1 4 1 2 4 3 3
10 0 0 0 2 4 2 4 1 3 1 4 1
11 0 0 0 3 2 3 3 1 2 1 4 1
12 0 0 0 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 4 2
13 0 0 0 3 3 3 1 1 2 1 4 1
14 0 0 0 3 3 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
15 0 0 0 3 3 3 2 1 2 2 4 1
16 0 0 0 3 3 2 3 1 3 1 4 1
17 0 0 0 3 3 2 4 1 3 1 4 1
18 0 0 0 3 4 3 1 1 1 2 4 2
19 0 0 0 3 4 3 3 1 2 1 4 1
20 0 0 0 4 2 2 0 0 0 4 4 1
21 0 0 0 4 2 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
22 0 0 0 4 2 3 3 1 2 1 4 1
23 0 0 0 4 2 3 4 1 2 1 4 1
24 0 0 0 4 3 2 0 0 0 1 4 1
25 0 0 0 4 3 2 0 0 0 2 4 1
26 0 0 0 4 3 3 2 1 1 2 4 2
27 0 0 0 4 3 3 3 1 2 2 4 1
28 0 0 0 4 3 2 4 1 3 1 4 1
29 0 0 0 4 4 2 0 0 0 1 4 1
30 0 0 0 4 4 2 0 0 0 2 4 1
31 0 0 0 4 4 3 1 1 1 1 4 2
32 0 0 0 4 4 3 1 1 2 1 4 1
33 0 0 0 4 4 3 1 1 1 2 4 2
34 0 0 0 4 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
35 0 0 0 4 4 3 2 1 1 2 4 2
36 0 0 0 4 4 3 3 1 2 3 4 1
37 0 0 0 4 4 3 4 1 2 1 4 1
38 0 0 0 4 4 3 4 1 2 2 4 1
39 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 4 1 4 1
40 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1
41 2 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 4 1
42 2 1 3 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 4 1
43 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 1 4 1 4 1
44 2 1 4 2 4 2 2 1 3 1 3 1
45 2 1 3 2 4 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
46 2 1 3 3 2 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 21
Table 6: Continued.
Near Miss 𝑇
𝑠
𝑀
𝑠
𝑂
𝑠
𝑇
𝑠𝑎
𝑀
𝑠𝑎
𝑂
𝑠𝑎
𝑇
𝑐
𝑀
𝑐
𝑂
𝑐
𝑇
𝑝
𝑀
𝑝
𝑂
𝑝
47 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 1 4 1 4 1
48 2 1 3 3 3 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
49 2 1 2 3 3 3 3 1 4 1 4 1
50 2 1 3 3 4 4 1 1 2 1 4 1
51 2 1 2 3 4 3 3 1 4 1 4 1
52 2 1 3 4 1 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
53 2 1 3 4 3 4 1 1 2 1 4 1
54 2 1 2 4 3 4 3 1 3 1 4 1
55 2 1 2 4 3 4 4 1 3 1 4 1
56 2 1 2 4 4 3 0 0 0 1 4 1
57 2 2 3 3 4 4 1 1 2 1 4 1
58 2 2 3 4 4 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
59 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1
60 3 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 2
61 3 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 4 1
62 3 1 3 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 3 1
63 3 1 3 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 4 1
64 3 1 3 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 4 1
65 3 1 4 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 4 1
66 3 1 4 2 2 2 2 1 3 2 4 1
67 3 1 4 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 4 2
68 3 1 3 2 2 2 4 1 4 1 4 1
69 3 1 4 2 3 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
70 3 1 4 2 4 3 1 1 2 1 4 1
71 3 1 4 2 4 2 3 1 3 1 4 1
72 3 1 3 3 1 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
73 3 1 2 3 1 3 3 1 4 1 4 1
74 3 1 3 3 1 4 3 1 2 1 4 1
75 3 1 2 3 1 3 4 1 4 1 4 1
76 3 1 2 3 2 3 0 0 0 1 4 1
77 3 1 3 3 2 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
78 3 1 4 3 2 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
79 3 1 2 3 2 4 3 1 3 1 4 1
80 3 1 3 3 2 4 3 1 2 2 4 1
81 3 1 3 3 2 2 4 1 4 1 4 1
82 3 1 2 3 3 3 0 0 0 1 4 1
83 3 1 4 3 3 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
84 3 1 3 3 3 4 3 1 2 1 4 1
85 3 1 4 3 3 2 3 1 3 1 4 1
86 3 1 3 3 3 2 4 1 4 1 4 1
87 3 1 2 3 4 3 0 0 0 1 4 1
88 3 1 3 3 4 4 1 1 2 1 4 1
89 3 1 4 3 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
90 3 1 2 3 4 4 3 1 3 1 4 1
91 3 1 2 3 4 3 4 1 4 1 4 1
92 3 1 3 4 1 4 1 1 1 1 4 2
93 3 1 3 4 1 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
94 3 1 2 4 1 3 4 1 4 1 4 1
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Table 6: Continued.
Near Miss 𝑇
𝑠
𝑀
𝑠
𝑂
𝑠
𝑇
𝑠𝑎
𝑀
𝑠𝑎
𝑂
𝑠𝑎
𝑇
𝑐
𝑀
𝑐
𝑂
𝑐
𝑇
𝑝
𝑀
𝑝
𝑂
𝑝
95 3 1 3 4 2 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
96 3 1 3 4 2 4 2 1 2 2 4 1
97 3 1 3 4 2 4 3 1 2 1 4 1
98 3 1 3 4 2 4 3 1 2 2 4 1
99 3 1 3 4 3 4 1 1 2 1 4 1
100 3 1 3 4 3 4 3 1 2 1 4 1
101 3 1 3 4 3 4 3 1 2 2 4 1
102 3 1 2 4 3 4 4 1 3 2 4 1
103 3 1 2 4 4 3 0 0 0 1 4 1
104 3 1 3 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 4 2
105 3 1 3 4 4 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
106 3 1 3 4 4 4 2 1 2 2 4 1
107 3 1 3 4 4 4 3 1 2 1 4 1
108 3 1 2 4 4 4 4 1 3 1 4 1
109 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1
110 3 2 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 2
111 3 2 3 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 4 1
112 3 2 2 0 0 0 3 1 3 1 4 1
113 3 2 2 0 0 0 4 1 3 1 4 1
114 3 2 4 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 4 1
115 3 2 3 2 3 2 0 0 0 1 4 1
116 3 2 4 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 3 3
117 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 1 4 1 4 1
118 3 2 3 3 1 4 1 1 1 1 4 2
119 3 2 2 3 1 3 3 1 4 1 4 1
120 3 2 2 3 1 3 4 1 4 1 4 1
121 3 2 3 3 2 4 1 1 1 1 4 2
122 3 2 4 3 2 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
123 3 2 3 3 2 4 3 1 2 1 4 1
124 3 2 2 3 3 3 0 0 0 1 4 1
125 3 2 3 3 3 2 0 0 0 1 4 1
126 3 2 4 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 4 2
127 3 2 3 3 3 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
128 3 2 4 3 3 3 2 1 2 2 4 1
129 3 2 2 3 3 4 3 1 3 1 4 1
130 3 2 3 3 3 4 3 1 2 1 4 1
131 3 2 4 3 3 2 3 1 3 1 4 1
132 3 2 4 3 3 3 3 1 2 1 4 1
133 3 2 3 3 3 4 3 1 2 2 4 1
134 3 2 2 3 3 3 4 1 4 1 4 1
135 3 2 3 3 3 2 4 1 4 1 4 1
136 3 2 3 3 4 4 1 1 2 1 4 1
137 3 2 3 3 4 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
138 3 2 4 3 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
139 3 2 2 3 4 3 4 1 4 1 4 1
140 3 2 2 3 4 3 4 1 4 2 4 1
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Table 6: Continued.
Near Miss 𝑇
𝑠
𝑀
𝑠
𝑂
𝑠
𝑇
𝑠𝑎
𝑀
𝑠𝑎
𝑂
𝑠𝑎
𝑇
𝑐
𝑀
𝑐
𝑂
𝑐
𝑇
𝑝
𝑀
𝑝
𝑂
𝑝
141 3 2 2 4 1 4 3 1 3 1 4 1
142 3 2 2 4 1 4 4 1 3 1 4 1
143 3 2 3 4 2 4 1 1 2 1 4 1
144 3 2 3 4 2 4 3 1 2 1 4 1
145 3 2 3 4 2 4 3 1 2 2 4 1
146 3 2 2 4 2 3 4 1 4 1 4 1
147 3 2 2 4 2 4 4 1 3 1 4 1
148 3 2 3 4 3 4 1 1 1 2 4 2
149 3 2 2 4 3 4 3 1 3 1 4 1
150 3 2 3 4 3 4 3 1 2 1 4 1
151 3 2 3 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 4 2
152 3 2 3 4 4 4 1 1 2 1 4 1
153 3 3 3 2 3 2 4 1 4 1 4 1
154 3 3 4 2 4 3 1 1 2 1 4 1
155 3 3 4 3 3 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
156 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 1 4 1 4 1
157 3 3 4 3 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
158 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 1 2 1 4 1
159 4 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1
160 4 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 1
161 4 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 2
162 4 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 4 1
163 4 1 3 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 4 2
164 4 1 3 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 4 1
165 4 1 3 0 0 0 3 1 2 3 4 1
166 4 1 2 0 0 0 4 1 3 1 4 1
167 4 1 3 0 0 0 4 1 2 1 4 1
168 4 1 3 0 0 0 4 1 2 2 4 1
169 4 1 4 2 2 3 1 1 2 1 4 1
170 4 1 4 2 2 2 3 1 3 2 4 1
171 4 1 4 2 3 3 1 1 2 1 4 1
172 4 1 4 2 4 2 4 1 3 1 4 1
173 4 1 4 3 2 3 1 1 1 1 4 2
174 4 1 3 3 2 2 4 1 4 2 4 1
175 4 1 3 3 3 2 0 0 0 1 4 1
176 4 1 4 3 3 3 1 1 2 1 4 1
177 4 1 4 3 3 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
178 4 1 3 3 4 2 0 0 0 1 4 1
179 4 1 4 3 4 3 1 1 1 1 4 2
180 4 1 4 3 4 3 2 1 2 2 4 1
181 4 1 4 3 4 3 3 1 2 1 4 1
182 4 1 4 3 4 3 3 1 2 2 4 1
183 4 1 3 3 4 2 4 1 4 2 4 1
184 4 1 2 4 1 3 0 0 0 1 4 1
185 4 1 2 4 1 3 0 0 0 2 4 1
186 4 1 3 4 1 4 1 1 1 2 4 2
187 4 1 3 4 1 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
188 4 1 3 4 1 4 2 1 2 2 4 1
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Table 6: Continued.
Near Miss 𝑇
𝑠
𝑀
𝑠
𝑂
𝑠
𝑇
𝑠𝑎
𝑀
𝑠𝑎
𝑂
𝑠𝑎
𝑇
𝑐
𝑀
𝑐
𝑂
𝑐
𝑇
𝑝
𝑀
𝑝
𝑂
𝑝
189 4 1 3 4 1 4 3 1 2 1 4 1
190 4 1 2 4 1 3 4 1 4 1 4 1
191 4 1 3 4 1 4 4 1 2 1 4 1
192 4 1 2 4 1 3 4 1 4 2 4 1
193 4 1 3 4 1 4 4 1 2 3 4 1
194 4 1 2 4 2 3 0 0 0 1 4 1
195 4 1 3 4 2 4 1 1 1 1 4 2
196 4 1 4 4 2 3 1 1 2 1 4 1
197 4 1 3 4 2 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
198 4 1 4 4 2 3 2 1 1 2 4 2
199 4 1 3 4 2 4 2 1 2 2 4 1
200 4 1 3 4 2 4 3 1 2 2 4 1
201 4 1 2 4 2 3 4 1 4 1 4 1
202 4 1 3 4 2 2 4 1 4 1 4 1
203 4 1 3 4 2 4 4 1 2 1 4 1
204 4 1 2 4 2 4 4 1 3 2 4 1
205 4 1 3 4 2 4 4 1 2 2 4 1
206 4 1 4 4 2 2 4 1 3 3 4 1
207 4 1 2 4 3 3 0 0 0 1 4 1
208 4 1 3 4 3 2 0 0 0 1 4 1
209 4 1 4 4 3 3 1 1 1 1 4 2
210 4 1 3 4 3 4 1 1 2 1 4 1
211 4 1 4 4 3 3 1 1 2 1 4 1
212 4 1 3 4 3 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
213 4 1 4 4 3 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
214 4 1 4 4 3 3 2 1 1 2 4 2
215 4 1 3 4 3 4 2 1 2 2 4 1
216 4 1 4 4 3 3 2 1 2 2 4 1
217 4 1 3 4 3 4 3 1 2 1 4 1
218 4 1 3 4 3 4 3 1 2 3 4 1
219 4 1 2 4 3 3 4 1 4 1 4 1
220 4 1 2 4 3 4 4 1 3 1 4 1
221 4 1 3 4 3 2 4 1 4 1 4 1
222 4 1 3 4 3 4 4 1 2 1 4 1
223 4 1 2 4 3 3 4 1 4 2 4 1
224 4 1 3 4 3 4 4 1 2 2 4 1
225 4 1 4 4 3 2 4 1 3 2 4 1
226 4 1 2 4 4 3 0 0 0 2 4 1
227 4 1 3 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 4 2
228 4 1 4 4 4 3 1 1 1 1 4 2
229 4 1 4 4 4 3 1 1 1 2 4 2
230 4 1 3 4 4 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
231 4 1 4 4 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
232 4 1 4 4 4 3 2 1 2 2 4 1
233 4 1 3 4 4 4 3 1 2 1 4 1
234 4 1 4 4 4 3 3 1 2 1 4 1
235 4 1 3 4 4 4 3 1 2 3 4 1
236 4 1 3 4 4 4 4 1 2 1 4 1
237 4 1 4 4 4 2 4 1 3 2 4 1
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Table 6: Continued.
Near Miss 𝑇
𝑠
𝑀
𝑠
𝑂
𝑠
𝑇
𝑠𝑎
𝑀
𝑠𝑎
𝑂
𝑠𝑎
𝑇
𝑐
𝑀
𝑐
𝑂
𝑐
𝑇
𝑝
𝑀
𝑝
𝑂
𝑝
238 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 1
239 4 2 3 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 4 1
240 4 2 3 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 4 2
241 4 2 3 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 4 1
242 4 2 3 0 0 0 3 1 2 1 4 1
243 4 2 3 0 0 0 3 1 2 2 4 1
244 4 2 3 0 0 0 4 1 2 1 4 1
245 4 2 2 0 0 0 4 1 3 2 4 1
246 4 2 3 1 3 2 0 0 0 1 3 1
247 4 2 4 2 1 3 2 1 1 2 4 2
248 4 2 4 2 3 2 4 1 3 1 4 1
249 4 2 3 2 4 2 0 0 0 1 4 1
250 4 2 4 3 2 3 1 1 2 1 4 1
251 4 2 4 3 2 2 3 1 3 3 4 1
252 4 2 3 3 2 2 4 1 4 1 4 1
253 4 2 3 3 3 2 0 0 0 1 4 1
254 4 2 4 3 3 3 1 1 1 2 4 2
255 4 2 4 3 3 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
256 4 2 4 3 3 3 3 1 2 1 4 1
257 4 2 3 3 3 2 4 1 4 1 4 1
258 4 2 4 3 3 2 4 1 3 1 4 1
259 4 2 4 3 4 3 1 1 1 1 4 2
260 4 2 4 3 4 3 1 1 1 2 4 2
261 4 2 4 3 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
262 4 2 4 3 4 3 3 1 2 1 4 1
263 4 2 2 4 1 3 0 0 0 2 4 1
264 4 2 3 4 1 4 1 1 1 1 4 2
265 4 2 3 4 1 4 3 1 2 1 4 1
266 4 2 2 4 1 4 4 1 3 1 4 1
267 4 2 2 4 1 3 4 1 4 2 4 1
268 4 2 3 4 1 4 4 1 2 2 4 1
269 4 2 3 4 2 2 0 0 0 4 4 1
270 4 2 3 4 2 4 1 1 1 1 4 2
271 4 2 3 4 2 4 1 1 1 2 4 2
272 4 2 4 4 2 3 2 1 1 4 4 2
273 4 2 4 4 2 3 3 1 2 1 4 1
274 4 2 3 4 2 4 3 1 2 2 4 1
275 4 2 3 4 2 4 3 1 2 3 4 1
276 4 2 2 4 2 3 4 1 4 1 4 1
277 4 2 3 4 2 2 4 1 4 1 4 1
278 4 2 3 4 2 4 4 1 2 1 4 1
279 4 2 4 4 2 3 4 1 2 1 4 1
280 4 2 2 4 2 4 4 1 3 2 4 1
281 4 2 3 4 3 2 0 0 0 1 4 1
282 4 2 3 4 3 2 0 0 0 2 4 1
283 4 2 4 4 3 3 1 1 1 1 4 2
284 4 2 3 4 3 4 1 1 2 1 4 1
285 4 2 4 4 3 3 1 1 2 1 4 1
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Table 6: Continued.
Near Miss 𝑇
𝑠
𝑀
𝑠
𝑂
𝑠
𝑇
𝑠𝑎
𝑀
𝑠𝑎
𝑂
𝑠𝑎
𝑇
𝑐
𝑀
𝑐
𝑂
𝑐
𝑇
𝑝
𝑀
𝑝
𝑂
𝑝
286 4 2 3 4 3 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
287 4 2 4 4 3 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
288 4 2 3 4 3 4 2 1 1 2 4 2
289 4 2 4 4 3 3 2 1 1 2 4 2
290 4 2 4 4 3 3 2 1 2 2 4 1
291 4 2 4 4 3 3 3 1 2 1 4 1
292 4 2 3 4 3 4 3 1 2 2 4 1
293 4 2 2 4 3 4 4 1 3 1 4 1
294 4 2 3 4 3 4 4 1 2 1 4 1
295 4 2 2 4 3 3 4 1 4 2 4 1
296 4 2 2 4 3 4 4 1 3 2 4 1
297 4 2 4 4 3 3 4 1 2 2 4 1
298 4 2 3 4 4 2 0 0 0 1 4 1
299 4 2 2 4 4 3 0 0 0 2 4 1
300 4 2 3 4 4 2 0 0 0 2 4 1
301 4 2 4 4 4 3 1 1 2 1 4 1
302 4 2 4 4 4 3 1 1 1 2 4 2
303 4 2 3 4 4 4 2 1 2 1 4 1
304 4 2 4 4 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
305 4 2 4 4 4 3 2 1 1 2 4 2
306 4 2 3 4 4 4 3 1 2 1 4 1
307 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 1 3 1 4 1
308 4 2 3 4 4 2 4 1 4 1 4 1
309 4 2 4 4 4 2 4 1 3 1 4 1
310 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 1 3 2 4 1
311 4 2 3 4 4 2 4 1 4 2 4 1
312 4 3 3 2 4 2 0 0 0 1 4 1
313 4 3 4 2 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
314 4 3 4 3 3 2 3 1 3 1 4 1
315 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 1 2 1 4 1
316 4 3 3 3 4 2 0 0 0 1 4 1
317 4 3 4 3 4 3 1 1 2 1 4 1
318 4 3 3 3 4 2 4 1 4 1 4 1
319 4 3 4 3 4 2 4 1 3 1 4 1
320 4 3 3 4 3 2 0 0 0 2 4 1
321 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 1 2 1 4 1
322 4 3 4 4 3 2 4 1 3 2 4 1
323 4 3 3 4 4 2 0 0 0 2 4 1
324 4 3 4 4 4 3 1 1 1 1 4 2
325 4 3 4 4 4 3 1 1 2 1 4 1
326 4 3 4 4 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1
327 4 3 4 4 4 3 2 1 1 2 4 2
328 4 3 4 4 4 3 2 1 2 2 4 1
329 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 1 2 1 4 1
330 4 3 3 4 4 2 4 1 4 1 4 1
331 4 3 3 4 4 2 4 1 4 2 4 1
332 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 1 2 3 4 1
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Figure 21: (a)𝑁rl evolution when simultaneously the safety relief valve fails stuck with𝑄sf = 50.5 (kg/s) and the communication fails; (b) the
steam valve fails stuck closed; (c) the PID controller fails stuck at 18% of the nominal 𝑄
𝑒
that should be provided at 80% 𝑃
𝑛
.
x: System state
?̇?: Derivative of system state
𝑁ref: Narrow range steam generator water level at
a reference position
𝑁high: Automatic reactor trip threshold
𝑁low: Turbine trip threshold
𝑁
ℎ𝑙
: First prealarm automatic reactor trip
threshold
𝑁
𝑙𝑙
: First prealarm turbine trip threshold
𝑁Vℎ: Second prealarm automatic reactor trip
threshold
𝑁V𝑙: First prealarm turbine trip threshold
𝑄pid: Water flow rate provided by PID controller
𝑄sf: Water flow rate removed by safety valve
𝑇miss: Mission time
𝑡mvl: Time steps in MVL discretization
𝜑: Cumulative probability function of the
Gaussian distribution
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beginning of the
mission time
fails stuck close
at the beginning
of the mission
time
fails stuck at the
maximum value at
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time
Figure 22: Fault tree for the low level failure mode at high power.
𝜇: Mean value of the Gaussian distribution
𝜎: Standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution
𝐴: Intensity coefficient
𝐾: Number of clusters
𝑛: Index of the profile of 𝑝, 𝑐, and 𝑟
𝜇
𝑛
: Mean value of the 𝑛th profile
max: Peak value of the 𝑛th profile
𝜎
𝑛
: Standard deviation of the 𝑛th profile
RMS: Root mean square of the 𝑛th profile
SK: Skewness of the 𝑛th profile
KU: Kurtosis of the 𝑛th profile
𝑁: Number of scenarios to the training set
𝐹: Dimension of the set of features
𝑇set: Number of scenarios to the test set
𝑆𝑆
𝑏
: Overall between-cluster variance
𝑆𝑆
𝑤
: Overall within-cluster variance
𝑛
𝑘
: Number of scenarios assigned to the 𝑘th cluster
𝑥
𝑐
: Generic scenario
𝑚
𝑘
: Centroid of the 𝑘th cluster
𝜇risk: Mean risk of the clustered scenarios
𝑡risk: Time elapsed from the instant at which 𝑟 starts
to deviate from zero of the clustered scenarios
𝑓: Fitness function of the MOP
𝑓
1
: First objective function of the MOP
𝑓
2
: Second objective function of the MOP
x: Sequence vector belonging to the Pareto set of
the MOP.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
[1] D. G. Kang, S.-H. Ahn, and S. H. Chang, “A combined deter-
ministic and probabilistic procedure for safety assessment of
beyond design basis accidents in nuclear power plant: applica-
tion to ECCS performance assessment for design basis LOCA
redefinition,”Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol. 260, pp. 165–
174, 2013.
[2] E. Zio and F. Di Maio, “The needs and dreams for methodolo-
gies of IDPSA,” in Proceedings of the Integrated Deterministic
and Probabilistic Safety Analyses Workshop, KTH, Stockholm,
Sweden, November 2012.
[3] E. Zio, F. Di Maio, and J. Tong, “Safety margins confidence esti-
mation for a passive residual heat removal system,” Reliability
Engineering and System Safety, vol. 95, no. 8, pp. 828–836, 2010.
[4] T. Aldemir, “A survey of dynamicmethodologies for probabilis-
tic safety assessment of nuclear power plants,”Annals of Nuclear
Energy, vol. 52, pp. 113–124, 2013.
[5] W. Keller and M. Modarres, “A historical overview of proba-
bilistic risk assessment development and its use in the nuclear
power industry: a tribute to the late Professor Norman Carl
Rasmussen,” Reliability Engineering and System Safety, vol. 89,
no. 3, pp. 271–285, 2005.
[6] Y. Vorobyev and P. Kudinov, “Development and application of a
genetic algorithm based dynamic pra methodology to plant
vulnerability search,” in International Topical Meeting on Proba-
bilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, vol. 1, pp. 559–573, 2011.
[7] N. Khakzad, F. Khan, and P. Amyotte, “Dynamic risk analysis
using bow-tie approach,” Reliability Engineering and System
Safety, vol. 104, pp. 36–44, 2012.
[8] M. Marseguerra and E. Zio, “Monte Carlo approach to PSA for
dynamic process systems,” Reliability Engineering and System
Safety, vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 227–241, 1996.
[9] J. Kirschenbaum, P. Bucci, M. Stovsky et al., “A benchmark sys-
tem for comparing reliability modeling approaches for digital
instrumentation and control systems,” Nuclear Technology, vol.
165, no. 1, pp. 53–95, 2009.
[10] T. Aldemir, S. Guarro, J. Kirschenbaum et al., “A Benchmark
implementation of two dynamic methodologies for the reliabil-
ity modeling of digital instrumentation and control systems,”
NUREG-CR Report Draft, 2008.
[11] P. E. Labeau, C. Smidts, and S. Swaminathan, “Dynamic reliabil-
ity: towards an integrated platform for probabilistic risk assess-
ment,” Reliability Engineering and System Safety, vol. 68, no.
3, pp. 219–254, 2000.
[12] E. Zio, “Integrated deterministic and probabilistic safety assess-
ment: concepts, challenges, research directions,” Nuclear Engi-
neering and Design, vol. 280, pp. 413–419, 2014.
[13] J. Devooght and C. Smidts, “Probabilistic reactor dynamics I:
the theory of continuous event trees,” Nuclear Science and
Engineering, vol. 111, no. 3, pp. 229–240, 1992.
[14] V. Kopustinskas, J. Augutis, and S. Rimkevicˇius, “Dynamic
reliability and risk assessment of the accident localization
system of the Ignalina NPP RBMK-1500 reactor,” Reliability
Engineering and System Safety, vol. 87, no. 1, pp. 77–87, 2005.
[15] E. Hofer, M. Kloos, B. Krzykacz-Hausmann, J. Peschke, and
M. Sonnenkalb, Dynamic Event Trees for Probabilistic Safety
Analysis, Gesellschaft fu¨r Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, Gar-
sching, Germany, 2004.
[16] A. Hakobyan, R. Denning, T. Aldemir, S. Dunagan, and D.
Kunsman, “A methodology for generating dynamic accident
progression event trees for level 2 PRA,” Tech. Rep. SAND2008-
4746, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA,
2008.
[17] F. Di Maio, S. Baronchelli, and E. Zio, “A computational
framework for prime implicants identification in non-coherent
dynamic systems,” Risk Analysis, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 142–156, 2015.
Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 29
[18] W. V. Quine, “The problem of simplifying truth functions,”The
American Mathematical Monthly, vol. 59, pp. 521–531, 1952.
[19] E. Zio and F. D. Maio, “Processing dynamic scenarios from a
reliability analysis of a nuclear power plant digital instrumenta-
tion and control system,” Annals of Nuclear Energy, vol. 36, no.
9, pp. 1386–1399, 2009.
[20] V. M. Bier and W. Yi, “The performance of precursor-based
estimators for rare event frequencies,” Reliability Engineering
and System Safety, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 241–251, 1995.
[21] J. W. Johnson and D. M. Rasmuson, “The US NRC’s accident
sequence precursor program: an overview and development
of a Bayesian approach to estimate core damage frequency
using precursor information,” Reliability Engineering and Sys-
tem Safety, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 205–216, 1996.
[22] J. H. Saleh, E. A. Saltmarsh, F. M. Favaro`, and L. Brevault,
“Accident precursors, near misses, and warning signs: critical
review and formal definitions within the framework of Discrete
Event Systems,” Reliability Engineering and System Safety, vol.
114, no. 1, pp. 148–154, 2013.
[23] O. Zadakbar, S. Imtiaz, and F. Khan, “Dynamic risk assessment
and fault detection using a multivariate technique,” Process
Safety Progress, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 365–375, 2013.
[24] K. Fukunaga andL.D.Hostetler, “The estimation of the gradient
of a density function, with applications in pattern recognition,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 32–
40, 1975.
[25] D. Mandelli, A. Yilmaz, K. Metzroth, T. Aldemir, and R.
Denning, “Scenario aggregation and analysis via Mean-Shift
Methodology,” in Proceedings of the International Congress on
Advances in Nuclear Power Plants (ICAPP ’10), vol. 2, pp. 987–
991, June 2010.
[26] J. C. Bezdek, Pattern Recognition with Fuzzy Objective Function
Algorithms, Kluwer Academic, Norwell, Mass, USA, 1981.
[27] J. F. Aubry, G. Babykina, A. Barros et al., “Project APPRODYN:
APPROches de la fiabilite´ DYNamique pour mode´liser des
syste`mes critiques,” Tech. Rep., Collaboration CRAN, EDF
R&D, INRIACQFD, UTT-ICD, 2012.
[28] M. V. Kothare, B. Mettler, M. Morari, P. Bendotti, and C.-M.
Falinower, “Level control in the steam generator of a nuclear
power plant,” IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology,
vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 55–69, 2000.
[29] H. Habibiyan, S. Setayeshi, and H. Arab-Alibeik, “A fuzzy-
gain-scheduled neural controller for nuclear steam generators,”
Annals of Nuclear Energy, vol. 31, no. 15, pp. 1765–1781, 2004.
[30] M. Marseguerra, E. Zio, and F. Cadini, “Optimized adaptive
fuzzy controller of the water level of a pressurized water reactor
steam generator,” Nuclear Science and Engineering, vol. 155, no.
3, pp. 386–394, 2007.
[31] [IAEA-TECDOC-981; 1997], “Assessment and management of
ageing of major nuclear power plant component important to
safety: Steam,” IAEA, IAEA-TECDOC-98, Vienna, 1997.
[32] S. F. Garribba, E. Guagnini, and P. Mussio, “Multiple-valued
logic trees: meaning and prime implicants,” IEEE Transactions
on Reliability, vol. 34, no. 5, pp. 463–472, 1985.
[33] F. Di Maio, S. Baronchelli, M. Vagnoli, and E. Zio, “Prime
implicants determination by differential evolution for dynamic
reliability analysis of non-coherent systems,” Reliability Engi-
neering and System Safety. Under review.
[34] F. Di Maio, S. Baronchelli, and E. Zio, “A visual interactive
method for prime implicants identification,” IEEE Transactions
on Reliability, no. 99, pp. 1–11, 2014.
[35] C. M. Rocco and M. Muselli, “A machine learning algorithm
to estimate minimal cut and path sets from a Monte Carlo
simulation,” inProbabilistic Safety Assessment andManagement,
pp. 3142–3147, Springer, London, UK, 2004.
[36] F. Di Maio, J. Hu, P. Tse, M. Pecht, K. Tsui, and E. Zio,
“Ensemble-approaches for clustering health status of oil sand
pumps,” Expert Systems with Applications, vol. 39, no. 5, pp.
4847–4859, 2012.
[37] R. Kohavi and G. H. John, “Wrappers for feature subset selec-
tion,” Artificial Intelligence, vol. 97, no. 1-2, pp. 273–324, 1997.
[38] P. Baraldi, F. Cannarile, F. Di Maio, and E. Zio, “Hierarchical
k-nearest neighbours classification and binary differential evo-
lution for fault diagnostics of automotive bearings operating
under variable conditions,” Reliability Engineering and System
Safety. Under review.
[39] L. Wang, X. Fu, M. I. Menhas, and M. Fei, “A modified binary
differential evolution algorithm,” in Life System Modeling and
Intelligent Computing, vol. 6329 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pp. 49–57, Springer, Berlin, Germany, 2010.
[40] J. MacQueen, “Some methods for classification and analysis of
multivariate observations,” in Proceedings of the 5th Berkeley
Symposium onMathematical Statistics and Probability, vol. 1, pp.
281–297, Berkeley, Calif, USA, 1967.
[41] T. Calinski and J. Harabasz, “A dendrite method for cluster
analysis,” Communications in Statistics, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 1–27,
1974.
[42] K. Deb, A. Pratap, S. Agarwal, and T. Meyarivan, “A fast and
elitist multiobjective genetic algorithm: NSGA-II,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Evolutionary Computation, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 182–197,
2002.
[43] J. E. Beasley and P. C. Chu, “A genetic algorithm for the set
covering problem,” European Journal of Operational Research,
vol. 94, no. 2, pp. 392–404, 1996.
[44] F. Di Maio, S. Baronchelli, and E. Zio, “Hierarchical differen-
tial evolution for minimal cut sets identification: application
to nuclear safety systems,” European Journal of Operational
Research, vol. 238, no. 2, pp. 645–652, 2014.
[45] R. W. Hamming, “Error detecting and error correcting codes,”
The Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 147–160,
1950.
[46] A. Popa and J. J. McDowell, “The effect of Hamming distances
in a computational model of selection by consequences,” Behav-
ioural Processes, vol. 84, no. 1, pp. 428–434, 2010.
Submit your manuscripts at
http://www.hindawi.com
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Structures
Journal of
 International Journal of
 Rotating
Machinery
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Industrial Engineering
Journal of
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Tribology
Advances in
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Energy
Journal of
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Hindawi Publishing Corporation 
http://www.hindawi.com
 Journal of
Engineering
Volume 2014
Hindawi Publishing Corporation 
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
 International Journal of
Photoenergy
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Nuclear Installations
Science and Technology of
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Solar Energy
Journal of
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Wind Energy
Journal of
Power Electronics
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Advances in
Fuels
Journal of
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Nuclear Energy
International Journal of
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
High Energy Physics
Advances in
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Mechanical 
Engineering
Advances in
Journal of
Petroleum Engineering
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
The Scientific 
World Journal
Hindawi Publishing Corporation 
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Journal of
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Renewable Energy
Combustion
Journal of
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
